A documented account by a group of former contractors of how - during the period when 100% of the shares of Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A. (now ELQ Energy S.A.) were held by the stock-listed Polenergia S.A. - labour law, banking law and consumer protection law were broken and bent. The finalisation of the sale of 100% of the company's shares - preceded by a write-down of approx. PLN 71M on its value - took place only after the irregularities had been formally reported to the management and supervisory boards of both companies. This page is updated on an ongoing basis - new harmed parties, both customers and former contractors of the company, keep coming forward to the group of whistleblowers.
The whistleblowers' account concerns solely the period up to 11 May 2026, when the company (KRS 0000879748) operated under the name Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A. as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Polenergia S.A. This page does not describe the current activities of ELQ Energy S.A. and the whistleblowers make no claims against it. The site's name refers to the way the Polenergia group conducted photovoltaics sales through its subsidiary in the period described - not to the share-sale transaction; the whistleblowers do not claim that the share sale was caused by their reports.
This page presents a joint account by a group of whistleblowers - former contractors of the company working as Field Sales Advisors (DTH) under B2B agreements. After reporting the irregularities, some of them faced retaliation. The mechanism described did not concern a single person - in the whistleblowers' assessment it was a systemic way of operating, covering approx. 50 advisers documented working in 2026 (reports coming in from former contractors point to a larger scale in earlier years), and hundreds - if not thousands - of customers, and on the scale of the company's multi-year operations - potentially far more people. The content of this page is updated as further reports come in.
14 recruitment ads carried an identical promise: "Average Adviser pay: PLN 32,000 net." Ads like this appeared cyclically across Poland - in Białystok, Ciechanów, Kielce, Milcz, Oleśnica, Ostrołęka, Przemyśl, Rzeszów, Sandomierz, Sanok, Słupsk, Tomaszów Mazowiecki, Wrocław and Zakopane - and they still appear today. Under the company's own Commission Remuneration Policy and internal sales rankings, this figure was mathematically impossible: at a commission of roughly PLN 500–900 per installation, an adviser would have to close 40–60 contracts a month, while the best performers in the team closed 3–5. The real average calculated from the team's data is around PLN 3,600.
The unbacked promise served only to attract as many sales reps as possible, who from day one bore the costs of running a business (social-security contributions, accounting) and were bound by a sweeping non-compete clause. The company had long been in crisis and lacked the sales volume to pay such amounts to anyone. The business model relied on selling an overpriced installation to an unaware customer (see violation 4), and then doing everything possible to avoid paying the rep the commission owed - people keep coming forward to the group of whistleblowers who, despite meeting the conditions of the commission policy, never received payment for contracts they signed and fulfilled.
Polenergia S.A. publicly justified the impairment write-down on the value of Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A. (now ELQ Energy S.A.; approx. PLN 71M, part of a group write-down of approx. PLN 92M for 2025) by "a slowdown in the prosumer market" and "failure to meet sales targets in Q2 2025." These were the very same months in which recruitment ads promising an average pay of PLN 32,000 net kept being published across Poland.
The company was presented with its own commission policy and internal sales rankings as proof that the promised amount was mathematically unattainable. Despite this, the company did not react and denied any wrongdoing - even though, in the whistleblowers' view, its own documents indicate the falsity of its advertisements and job ads. People who, despite meeting the policy's conditions, were never paid the commission they were owed continue to come forward to the group of whistleblowers.
The actual working conditions of approx. 50 advisers documented in 2026 - and, according to incoming reports from former contractors, on a larger scale in earlier years - matched the features of an employment relationship: daily briefings at 9:00/9:30 and "B2C Summary" conference calls scheduled in the calendar for every working day, daily activity reports and accountability for completed tasks to superiors, a "probation period" imposed by email, territorial assignment of districts, a "regional manager - advisers" structure, a sweeping non-compete clause without compensation, and invoices issued by the company on behalf of the contractors. This kind of daily accountability for work performed is not characteristic of B2B cooperation, in which the contractor independently organises their own time and way of working - it instead bears the hallmarks of employee subordination, and, in the whistleblowers' account, of mobbing.
The preserved Microsoft Teams screenshots show more than mere subordination. The Regional Manager held the adviser to account day after day for every single action: the number of "items to fix" (31 at once in one message), statuses in the Salesforce system, "overdue" leads, the timing and "effectiveness" of individual meetings, and even which specific leads activity had been logged on. Every remark was backed by screenshots monitoring the adviser's work in real time, dictating which meetings to hold and at what time.
In a genuine B2B model, the contractor organises their own work and is answerable for the result - the contracts signed - not for each action separately. The practice described, however, goes beyond even standard employee accountability: it was not about the outcome or pay, but about constant, granular control, pointing out shortcomings and exerting pressure. In the whistleblowers' assessment, such persistent and prolonged conduct bears the hallmarks of mobbing (Art. 94³ of the Labour Code) - harassment designed to lower a person's sense of professional usefulness and to coerce particular behaviour. The paradox is that the company applied control tools to "independent entrepreneurs" harsher than those used on a salaried employee, while denying them any employee rights.
From 8 July 2026, the State Labour Inspectorate (PIP) gains the power to issue administrative decisions reclassifying civil-law (B2B) contracts that disguise an employment relationship as employment contracts - without the need for prior court proceedings (enforcement of the decision is suspended pending any court appeal). Employers who voluntarily correct the situation within 12 months of the law's entry into force will avoid liability under the Labour Code. The whistleblowers have applied to PIP for access to the inspection form/protocol and will report on the progress of the proceedings on this page.
This is one of the most serious and most sensitive issues in this report - it potentially concerns hundreds of customers. According to the group of whistleblowers and the documents gathered, a single customer's financing was "split" into several parallel loan applications at different banks, without the customer's knowledge or consent. False information was allegedly given to the banks - also without the customers' knowledge or consent - and customers only found out they had taken out two or more loans after the fact.
In the whistleblowers' assessment, there is a reasonable suspicion that the practice was run and supervised by Marcin Koniusz, B2C Sales Channel Director, who is said to have directly instructed advisers on this way of operating and, after meetings with customers, held them accountable for whether they had followed the instructions. According to the whistleblowers' testimony, Marcin Koniusz is said to have personally entered customers' applications into the banks' systems in this manner.
The matter has been reported to the Prosecutor's Office - the notification was signed by a group of whistleblowers (more than one person). We will keep this page updated on the progress of the proceedings.
By conservative estimates, over 3–4 years, sales reps working with the company on Marcin Koniusz's instructions, in order to obtain commissions, may have misled anywhere from several hundred to several thousand customers in this way, by submitting loan applications containing false information to several banks at once.
The matter was reported to the management board of Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A. (now ELQ Energy S.A.) in April 2026 - directly to the President of the Management Board, Przemysław Brzywcy, along with descriptions of the other violations. Przemysław Brzywcy did not address this allegation, even though he commented on other matters in correspondence.
Whistleblowers witnessed training sessions and daily briefings in which advisers were instructed how to convince customers to sign contracts for photovoltaic installations at prices inflated by 15–35% compared to the market. The company offered no real benefit to justify this difference.
The main sales argument was belonging to the Polenergia group - a group which later sold this entity in its entirety (the company now operates under the name ELQ Energy S.A.). During the period the whistleblowers worked with the company, Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A. had no installers of its own employed - which did not stop the company from instructing advisers to tell customers it was the largest installer and servicer of photovoltaics in Poland.
Another argument was a "post-installation audit" that was supposed to take place after installation - which, according to the whistleblowers, was not carried out. Advisers were also instructed to justify the price difference by referring to the use of Stäubli MC4 connectors (cost approx. PLN 10/piece, with 20–40 pieces needed per installation) - an argument relying on customers' lack of knowledge of the real cost of components.
An additional element was misleading customers about the availability and amount of grants (e.g. "Mój Prąd", "Czyste Powietrze") and about the energy-production guarantee. The customer was promised, in the contract, a production guarantee at the level set out in the design - but that guarantee was only valid on condition that costly annual service inspections were carried out, which advisers were not allowed to tell customers.
If these arguments sound familiar - the "post-installation audit", expensive Stäubli connectors, "the largest installer in Poland", a production guarantee conditional on paid inspections you weren't told about when signing - you were most likely talked into buying an installation at a price significantly above market. There is a legal route to obtain compensation or to terminate an unfavourable contract entered into as a result of being misled - even if the installation is already on your roof. Get in touch using the form below.
Go to the report form ↓The mechanism consisted of several elements working together: an inflated price (15–35% above market), a high deposit (90% up front), unreliable sales arguments (a supposed "post-installation audit", expensive Stäubli connectors, claimed status as "the largest installer"), misleading communication about grants and the production guarantee, and - when the customer could not afford a loan for the full amount - "splitting" the financing across several banks "on a declaration" (see violation 3). As a result, the customer ended up with an overpriced installation, often financed by a loan they had not originally wanted or could not have obtained through normal channels. In the whistleblowers' assessment, these were not isolated pricing errors but a repeatable sales model.
The practice of quizzing advisers on customers' full names in front of dozens of participants in internal conference calls - with no control over the environment the advisers were in (cafés, restaurants, public places). Disclosure of customers' personal data to unauthorised persons, outside a secure processing environment.
Within 14 days of the irregularities being reported, the company: terminated the contract (3 days after the report), made two criminal threats (Art. 284 and 286 of the Criminal Code), demanded the destruction of evidence (recordings) and issued a debit note contrary to its own Fleet Rules - on the day the whistleblower's reply was served. A classic pattern of retaliation, where the law shifts the burden of proof onto the company.
On 15 June 2026, a group of whistleblowers filed a formal notice of suspected credit-fraud offence with the Regional Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw. The remaining violations are being pursued in parallel through civil and administrative channels.
The notice concerns an allegation under Art. 297 § 1 of the Criminal Code - submitting false statements in order to obtain credit - in conjunction with Art. 18 § 1 (directing the commission of the offence) and Art. 286 § 1 (fraud to the detriment of customers and banks).
The alleged scheme is said to have involved systematically "splitting" the financing of photovoltaic installations into several parallel loans at different banks (Alior Bank, BNP Paribas, Cofidis, Credit Agricole, Inbank) - so that no single bank carried out a full creditworthiness check, while the customer was reportedly made to sign false statements declaring they held their own funds. Customers often did not know that their applications were being sent to several banks at once, and only found out after the fact that they had two separate loans.
According to the whistleblowers, the scheme was allegedly organised and enforced directly by Marcin Koniusz (Director of the B2C Sales Channel), who is said to have explicitly instructed the advisers, held them to account after their meetings with customers, and personally entered applications in split mode. The notice also names Przemysław Brzywcy (President of the Management Board) in the context of directing the commission of the offence. Whether anyone is granted the status of a suspect is decided solely by the prosecutor; until then, the presumption of innocence applies.
The notice was filed by a group of whistleblowers - former advisers (DTH) of Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A. (now ELQ Energy S.A.). For the safety of those reporting, we do not disclose their number or personal data. Further former advisers are coming forward via this site; their testimony will be passed to the prosecuting authorities.
The company committed a series of other violations - recruitment fraud, sham self-employment (~50 advisers), price inflation, GDPR breaches and retaliation against whistleblowers - which are being pursued in parallel through civil proceedings and before the PIP, ZUS, UODO and UOKiK. The credit-fraud allegation, however, required a separate, formal notice to the prosecuting authorities - owing to its criminal nature and the scale of potential victims.
Every allegation is backed by a document. Some screenshots are already published in anonymised form (click to enlarge); the rest are being published gradually, after redacting third-party data (customers and advisers) in accordance with the GDPR.
Note: before publication, every screenshot requires redaction of customers' and advisers' personal data (first names, surnames, addresses, contract numbers). The professional details of persons holding managerial positions remain, as they relate to the function held.
The sequence of events shows that the finalisation of the company's sale took place only after the irregularities had been formally reported to the management boards and supervisory boards of both companies. The timeline sets out documented dates; the whistleblowers do not claim that the share sale was caused by their reports - according to Polenergia S.A.'s own statement, the transaction process had begun earlier.
According to the public register (KRS) and the correspondence in the matter, members of the subsidiary's bodies also sat in the structures of the parent company. The whistleblowers' letters of April and May 2026 were served on all of the bodies listed - before the sale was finalised.
Only after the irregularities were reported and escalated to the supervisory boards was the sale of 100% of the shares of Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A. (now ELQ Energy S.A.) to ELQ S.A. finalised. Below are the facts about the transaction and - clearly marked - the whistleblowers' assessment.
Selling an unprofitable company, burdened with freshly reported legal risks, to a financially weaker buyer for an undisclosed price, right after the matter was escalated - fits the picture of moving the problem off a listed issuer's balance sheet rather than an ordinary portfolio transaction.
A change of shareholder does not extinguish liability for events before the sale. The company's obligations remain in force, and the tort liability of its bodies (Art. 415, 416, 422 of the Civil Code) and contractual liability (Art. 471 of the Civil Code) do not move in time along with the shares.
The way the company addressed the allegations is itself telling.
In its correspondence the company did not address at all the most serious allegation - the instruction to "split" loan applications across several banks "on a declaration" (Art. 297 § 1 of the Criminal Code). Silence in the face of an allegation backed by dated internal correspondence and recordings is not accidental. The allegations concerning the B2G work, customers' GDPR rights and the systemic nature of the violations were also passed over.
Where the company does defend itself, it does so against its own documents. The claim of advisers' "independence" and the B2B nature of the cooperation cannot be reconciled with daily 9:00 briefings, daily reports, an email-imposed "probation period", territorial assignment and a non-compete clause with no compensation - all of which follow from its own rules, emails and system screenshots. The company also claimed it had paid commission - which is contradicted by the whistleblower's bank statement, on which no such payment is recorded.
On 1 June 2026 the company announced an internal investigation; by 14 July 2026 it had not presented a single finding in any of its letters. The only documented "step" remains the demand to hand over evidence to its lawyers.
Instead of clarifying the reported irregularities - demands to take down content. The correspondence runs on two tracks: from Polenergia S.A.'s lawyers (the parent company) and from Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A. (now ELQ Energy S.A.). Each card is labelled with its source. Below are documented facts (30 June, 7 July, 14 July 2026), with short quotes.
The demand letter required "the immediate handover of all information and documents that could indicate a breach of law" - to the email address of the law firm representing the company in the dispute. It was called an "investigation".
The whistleblowers' evidence goes solely to the state authorities.
The letter of 30 June alleged "blackmail" and suggested "manipulation of financial instruments". After the whistleblower's reply of 7 July, the 14 July response does not maintain any of those allegations - they disappear without a word.
The gravest accusations were abandoned once they had been rebutted on the merits.
Quote: the company "also does not contest your possible status as a whistleblower" as regards irregularities in the subsidiary.
The company states that it "is not in a dispute with you" - in the second letter prepared by an external law firm, containing a "final demand". In total, it is the third demand letter served on the whistleblower in this matter.
The company confirms receiving the report on 4 May 2026. The sale was finalised on 11 May, the announcement was published on 12 May - the reported risks were not disclosed in it.
The question remains whether the buyer was informed before closing.
The company claims it "no longer has any connection" with the subsidiary - and in the same letter admits that it had contacted it and informed it of the 30 June demand. On 7 July the whistleblower received near-identical demand letters from both entities (the same construction of demands, the same quote).
Coordination of actions against the whistleblower.
The letter demands the exclusive use of the current name "ELQ Energy S.A." - and itself writes of "Polenergia's sale of shares in ELQ Energy", even though the subject of the 11 May 2026 transaction was shares in a company then operating under the name Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A.
Despite written requests to point to even one specific false sentence, none of the three demand letters (the parent company lawyers’ letters of 30 June and 14 July, and ELQ Energy’s demand of 7 July) does so.
The general allegation of "falsity" remains unsubstantiated; the readiness to correct any demonstrated inaccuracy stands.
Paraphrase: in the lawyers' view, the manner of exercising oversight of the subsidiary "does not pose a threat to any public interest".
The integrity of oversight within a public company's group is by its nature a matter of public interest.
On 24 April 2026 a letter signed by the President of the Management Board demanded the destruction of conference-call recordings - evidence documenting the reported irregularities. On 7 July 2026 the same President signed a demand requiring the handover of all documents and materials held, to an email address.
The two demands cannot be reconciled: either the materials are worthless (the April version), or so important that the company demands their handover (the July version). The common denominator remains the drive to deprive the whistleblower of evidence - first by destroying it, then by seizing it.
In the 30 June letter the term "Fotowoltaika" appears 12 times and "ELQ Energy" 0 times. In the 14 July letter "ELQ Energy" appears 23 times and "Polenergia Fotowoltaika" twice. The lawyer writes of "Polenergia's sale of shares in ELQ Energy", even though the subject of the 11 May 2026 transaction was shares in a company then operating under the name Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A.
The author of the "false information" allegation publishes a falsehood about its own transaction - the fact it knows best. The deliberate linguistic shift detaches the word "Polenergia" from the violations described.
On its own website the company publishes almost exclusively positive reviews. For balance - and as a warning to customers and anyone considering working with it - we quote publicly available reviews from the Oferteo portal and from GoWork (employee and contractor reviews). All are from the period when the company operated under the name Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A. (now ELQ Energy S.A.), before the sale. These are third-party reviews - quoted in the original Polish, and they are not the whistleblowers' own statements.
Szczerze nie polecam! (…) Instalacja 5,96 kW. W ciągu dwóch pierwszych miesięcy dostawaliśmy maile (5-6 razy) o awaryjnym wyłączeniu falownika. (…) Po upływie roku okazało się, że instalacja wyprodukowała ok. 2400 kW. Czyli połowę! (…) usłyszeliśmy: „To nie nasza wina, proszę samemu składać pismo do PGE".
Nie polecam, miało być tak pięknie, a i tak wychodzi, że spłacamy kredyt i prawie takie same rachunki za prąd jak były bez paneli! (…) Dodzwonić się nie idzie. Odradzam każdemu.
Formalności ok, szybko, sprawnie, montaż też - ale panele po wyprodukowaniu ledwo 150 kWh padły. Nic nie produkują od 1,5 msc, firma mnie zbywa, każą wysyłać zdjęcia falownika itd. Zostaliśmy z kredytem i rachunkami za prąd. Nigdy więcej. Omijajcie tę firmę, bo reklamacje to porażka!!!
Telefon podany na umowie milczy od chwili dokonania wpłaty (…). Zgłoszenia o problemach z instalacją są zamykane bez żadnej reakcji - tylko standardowe formułki wysyłane przez robota. (…) Po ośmiu miesiącach od podpisania umowy i pół roku po terminie realizacji - mimo zgłoszeń, telefonów, e-maili - instalacja nie działa prawidłowo!!
Nękają telefonami, nie słuchają, co się do nich mówi, aby wykasowali nr telefonu z bazy, a gdy się informuje, że wyciągnie się konsekwencje - rozłączają się. Ponowny kontakt na nr, z którego dzwonili, jest niemożliwy. Stanowczo odradzam!
Ta firma to (…) zawyżają ceny za wszystko. Po podpisaniu umowy umywają ręce. Mam instalację z magazynem, ale wg Polenergii nie mogę z niej korzystać tak, jak bym chciał, tylko tak, jak oni chcą - inaczej stracę prawo do gwarancji.
Tragedia pod każdym względem. Do podpisania umowy wszystko super, później katastrofa - mnóstwo poprawek, bubli zagrażających życiu. Przestali odbierać telefony, spychologia; po zakończeniu prac latające dachówki i poprawki, które musiałem wykonać we własnym zakresie. Nie polecam.
Firma żyje z wyzysku handlowców. Żądają lojalności, nie dając w zamian nic. Nawet nie płacąc na koszty działalności. O przysłowiowej „misce ryżu" - zapomnij.
Nie wiem, skąd biorą się tak wysokie oceny tej firmy - odnoszę wrażenie, że część opinii może nie być do końca spontaniczna. Wygląda to tak, jakby wystawianie pozytywnych ocen było dodatkowym „niepisanym obowiązkiem". (…) Ceny oferowane klientom są wysokie i moim zdaniem nieadekwatne do jakości usług. Zalecam dużą ostrożność przed podjęciem współpracy z tą firmą.
Odradzam! Premie, które są częścią wynagrodzenia, są często ucinane. (…) W ciągu roku były dwie rundy zwolnień po kilkadziesiąt osób. Firma często opóźnia płatności podmiotom zewnętrznym. (…) Jeśli ktoś czyta te powyższe opinie, to w większości przypadków pozytywne opinie wpisują pracownicy HR.
Rozliczyłem się z pracodawcą z powierzonego sprzętu, fakturę wystawił pracodawca. Brak przelewu - „bo dział przekazał innemu działowi" itd. Wysyłam zdjęcia potwierdzające i nic. (…) Wynagrodzenia nadal nie ma. (…) Nie, NIE i JESZCZE RAZ NIE POLECAM.
Nie polecam pracy w tej firmie. Po odejściu nie wypłacono mi należnych prowizji, mimo że były wypracowane i zgodnie z umową powinny zostać rozliczone. Kontakt z przełożonymi po rozwiązaniu współpracy praktycznie nie istnieje - nikt nie potrafi udzielić jasnej odpowiedzi ani wyjaśnienia, a sprawa jest ciągle przeciągana.
The above are publicly available third-party reviews, quoted for informational and cautionary purposes (right of quotation), with the "unverified review" label originating from the portals; the authors remain anonymised. These are not the whistleblowers' statements - the presumption of innocence applies to the company and its representatives. The original screenshots remain on file.
The reviews below now appear on the Google profile "ELQ Energy S.A." - Google renamed the profile after the company was sold (formerly Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A.). They all concern installations and cooperation from the period when the company operated under the Polenergia name; some reviews explicitly mention "Polenergia". We publish them as screenshots (click to enlarge) - these are public third-party reviews, not the whistleblowers' statements.
The reviews below come from social media (Facebook) and concern the period when the company operated under the name Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A. (now ELQ Energy S.A.) and was 100% supervised by Polenergia S.A. Many screenshots capture whole threads with numerous comments from different people. We publish them as screenshots (click to enlarge) - these are public third-party reviews, not the whistleblowers' statements.
If, as a customer, you encountered the practices described, you can join the group action being organised. We are collecting reports to assess the scale and prepare joint legal representation (including a class action).
Write briefly what your case is about and attach any documents you have: the contract, the offer, the payment schedule, the loan agreement, correspondence. Your report will be used to assess the case and - with your consent - to pursue claims jointly.
The "B2B instead of a job" model means that the contributions due under an employment relationship may not have been paid for your work. If sham self-employment is established, this opens the way to claims for ZUS contributions, holiday pay, overtime and other employee dues - retroactively.
Your report will be added to the joint material directed to ZUS and PIP and - with your consent - to representation in the proceedings. The Whistleblower Protection Act protects against retaliation.
Go to the report form ↓Are you a journalist or do you represent an industry portal (photovoltaics, renewables, finance, the labour market)? Get in touch with us.
If you represent the press or an industry portal, write to us - we are happy to walk you through this company's story and help you prepare your material. The group of whistleblowers holds extensive, dated documentation (recruitment ads, internal policies, internal correspondence, CRM and Teams screenshots, conference-call recordings) as well as correspondence with the company and the authorities. We can share materials for review, provide comments (including on an anonymous basis), and point you to further witnesses - former advisers and harmed customers who are coming forward via this site.
Contact us as media ↓Please send press enquiries via the form below, selecting "Journalist / industry portal", or directly to alert@jak-polenergia-sprzedawala-fotowoltaike.pl.
This form is for reports from customers and current or former contractors of the company. Submitting a report costs nothing and creates no obligation - it will be used to assess the scale of the case and, with your consent, for joint pursuit of claims.
In the whistleblowers' assessment, the evidence for each allegation is sufficient to open proceedings independently of the others. The matter is being reported to the competent state authorities; at the same time, the path to an amicable settlement remains open.
Answers to the questions most often asked by customers, former advisers and journalists. All statements about irregularities have the status of the whistleblowers' allegations and assessments — the presumption of innocence applies.
This is an independent, documented account by a group of whistleblowers — former contractors of Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A. (now ELQ Energy S.A.) — about irregularities they witnessed during their cooperation. The site is not affiliated with or authorised by Polenergia S.A., ELQ Energy S.A. or ELQ S.A. It is based on documents held by the whistleblowers and on the Whistleblower Protection Act.
Yes — it is the same legal entity (KRS 0000879748, NIP 7792508573). Until 11 May 2026 the company operated under the name Polenergia Fotowoltaika S.A., with the stock-listed Polenergia S.A. as its sole shareholder. After the sale of 100% of the shares to ELQ S.A., the name was changed to ELQ Energy S.A. The events described on this site concern solely the period before that change.
Six areas: recruitment ads with an unattainable “average pay of PLN 32,000 net”, sham self-employment (B2B instead of employment), “splitting” customers’ loans across several banks, misleading customers about the price and features of the installation, GDPR breaches, and retaliation against whistleblowers. Each allegation is backed by documents described in the Evidence section; all have the status of allegations, not findings of a court.
Warning signs described in the whistleblowers’ account include: a deposit of around 90% before installation, arguments about a “post-installation audit”, “the most expensive connectors” or the status of “the largest installer in Poland”, and a price clearly higher than two or three comparison offers for the same scope. It is worth comparing your contract with current market prices for a similar capacity and storage. If this sounds familiar, you can report your case via the form. This is general information, not legal advice.
According to the whistleblowers, financing was sometimes split into applications to several banks “on a declaration”, and customers found out only after the fact. It is worth: obtaining your BIK credit report, gathering the loan agreements and correspondence with the seller, and reporting the matter to the bank. This thread is the subject of a notification being examined by the prosecutor. Affected customers can join the report via the form. This is general information, not legal advice.
If the cooperation looked like employment (daily briefings, reports, an assigned region, a supervisor, a non-compete clause without compensation), this may indicate an employment relationship within the meaning of Art. 22 of the Labour Code — regardless of the contract’s name. This opens the way to claims for ZUS contributions (up to 5 years back), holiday pay and other dues. The cooperation model at the company has been reported to PIP and ZUS. Join the report via the form. This is general information, not legal advice.
In the whistleblowers’ assessment — based on the company’s commission policy and internal sales rankings — this amount was mathematically unattainable: it would require closing dozens of contracts a month, while the best advisers closed a few. The real average calculated from the team’s data is around PLN 3,600. More than a dozen archived ads with this figure form evidence in the case.
The whistleblowers do not claim so. The dates are documented: the reports were served on the management and supervisory boards of both companies in April and early May 2026, and the sale of 100% of the shares was finalised on 11 May 2026. According to Polenergia S.A.’s statement, the transaction process had begun earlier. The timeline on the site presents facts and dates — we leave the conclusions to readers.
Instead of addressing the substance, the whistleblowers received three demand letters to take down content and hand over documents (two from Polenergia S.A.’s lawyers, one — almost identical — from ELQ Energy S.A.). None of the letters pointed to a single specific sentence claimed to be untrue. Details, including quotes, are in the Correspondence section.
A whistleblower is a person who reports breaches of law learned in a work-related context — including under B2B cooperation (Art. 4 of the Act of 14 June 2024 on the protection of whistleblowers). The Act prohibits retaliation (termination, threats, financial charges), shifts onto the company the burden of proving its actions were not retaliatory, and exempts the whistleblower from liability, among others, for infringement of personal rights where the report was made in good faith (Art. 16).
The publication constitutes a public disclosure within the meaning of the Whistleblower Protection Act and serves the public interest — warning customers and contractors. The documents are anonymised: data of customers and rank-and-file advisers are permanently redacted, while data of persons holding managerial functions remain solely in connection with the function held. Named persons may request a correction — the site publishes corrections of demonstrated inaccuracies.
On 15 June 2026 the group of whistleblowers filed a notice of suspected criminal offence (including Art. 297 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The case received a reference number and was transferred, according to jurisdiction, to the district prosecutor’s office. The proceedings are conducted ex officio, regardless of the parties’ will. Notifications to further authorities (PIP, ZUS, UOKiK, UODO, KNF) are filed or in preparation — current status in the Status section.
Yes. The group of whistleblowers holds dated documentation (ads, policies, internal correspondence, system screenshots, recordings) and makes it available to the media for review, including on an anonymous basis. Contact via the form (option “Journalist / industry portal”).
Via the form on the site — reporting is free and commits you to nothing. Customers: prepare your contract, offer and loan documents. Advisers: your cooperation period, the B2B contract and evidence of subordination (emails, briefing calendar, screenshots). The data goes solely to the group of whistleblowers and — with your consent — to the competent authorities.